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Outsourcing, firm size, and product complexity:
Evidence from credit unions
Introduction and summary
Outsourcing involves firms’ choosing to procure goods
or services from other firms rather than producing them
internally. For example, firms can outsource account-
ing and other business services to service providers
or maintain internal departments to meet these needs.
An automobile manufacturer can design and produce
parts internally or outsource by relying on suppliers
for production, design, manufacturing, or some com-
bination of these activities. The choices that firms make
regarding outsourcing have increasingly attracted the
attention of the media, policymakers, and researchers.
This attention stems in part from the fact that outsourc-
ing has become increasingly global in scope, meaning
that firms that outsource are often moving production
and jobs across international borders. In addition, a
growing number of researchers in recent years have
identified outsourcing as a key determinant of firm
profitability and, therefore, a key component of busi-
ness strategy. Competitive pressure continually drives
firms toward more efficient production. Because out-
sourcing helps firms to achieve this goal, understanding
the drivers of outsourcing improves our understanding
of business strategy.
Like any critical business decision, the decision to
outsource production or services has benefits and costs.
By outsourcing, small firms use more efficient suppliers
that can supply goods or services at lower cost. These
suppliers are often larger than their clients and have econ-
omies of scale that smaller firms could not achieve with
in-house production. Lower costs may also result from
competition among suppliers in their product markets,
providing firms that outsource with multiple options.
At the same time, outsourcing imposes transaction
costs of writing and enforcing contracts with suppli-
ers. Such benefits and costs of outsourcing would de-
pend on firm characteristics, the suppliers’ industry
structure, and the nature of the outsourced function.
In this article, we shed some light on the determi-
nants of outsourcing by studying outsourcing practices
of credit unions (CUs). Using data from the National
Credit Union Administration (NCUA), we examine
the outsourcing practices of CUs in their data process-
ing (DP). Data processing is a critical information
management function throughout the financial servic-
es industry, as it is in many other industries. Our data
are unique in that they contain rich information both
on CUs’ DP choices and a number of other firm-level
characteristics. This allows us to explore questions that
have received relatively little attention from researchers.
In particular, we focus on examining how CUs’ deci-
sions to outsource are associated with firm size and
the diversity of their product offerings.
Firm size may be important because it affects the
scale at which a firm can produce internally if it chooses
not to outsource. Scale economies are widely held to
influence firms’ outsourcing decisions, particularly for
functions that have relatively high fixed costs. Many
technology-based functions, such as data processing,
fall into this category because they impose significant
fixed hardware, software development, and training
costs. This suggests that smaller firms should outsource
more to take advantage of scale provided by special-
ized DP vendors. On the other hand, larger firms may
have more bargaining power with vendors, rendering
them more likely to enter relationships with suppliers.
This will be particularly true if large customers make
up a significant fraction of a given supplier’s business
(Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley, 1996).3 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
We also investigate the relationship between out-
sourcing and the product offerings of CUs. CUs offer
a wide array of financial services, with specific offer-
ings varying across and within firms. Offering a greater
number of products may have two effects on the de-
cision to outsource. First, if there are fixed costs as-
sociated with offering an individual product, greater
product diversity may change the fixed costs of inter-
nal production. This may change the scale economies
of internal versus external production. A second effect
of product diversity may be an increase in the complex-
ity of the firms’ DP requirements. In the literature on
transaction cost economics, which we discuss in more
detail below, product complexity is considered a primary
influence on firms’ decisions to outsource (Masten,
1984). The relationship between complexity and out-
sourcing is that more diverse product offerings create a
greater number of contingencies regarding future ven-
dor–firm interactions. This makes contracting costly
and discourages outsourcing.
Using the data from NCUA, we try to estimate the
relationship between firm size, product diversity, and
outsourcing. Our empirical results show that our two
measures of interest—CU size and product diversity—
both affect the propensity to outsource. Moreover,
they also interact in interesting ways; the relationship
between diversity and outsourcing is not simple. Up
to a point, greater diversity is associated with more
outsourcing, but firms with the greatest product variety
are less likely to outsource. This suggests that the
countervailing factors affecting outsourcing change
in importance with firm size and product diversity.
Beyond these relationships, CU size and product
diversity are also linked, with larger CUs offering more
products. Holding the number of products constant,
we find that for small/medium size CUs, diversity is
associated with more outsourcing. For large CUs,
diversity is associated with less outsourcing.
The economics of outsourcing
In its simplest form, the decision to outsource
depends on the relative costs of internal versus exter-
nal production for a given input. The firm chooses
internal production if its net benefits exceed those
associated with external production.
Theories of outsourcing attempt to explain firms’
decisions by modeling the factors that affect costs of
internal and external production. If production involves
significant scale economies, both internal and exter-
nal production should become cheaper in average cost
terms as the size of the producer increases. In general,
however, the scale of internal production is limited
by other constraints on firm size. This implies that
smaller firms are more likely to outsource, because
they can rely on scale economies provided by external
producers.
Competition in suppliers’ markets also encourages
outsourcing. Internal production may not be subject
to market discipline because internally produced in-
puts are not sold in competitive markets. Thus, inter-
nal production may be inefficient. A related problem
would arise if managers and workers associated with
internal production were not compensated in a manner
aligned with profit maximization at the firm level or
were difficult to monitor and could shirk. In such cases,
outsourcing might result in lower input prices. This
competitive effect may even make the costs of internal
production substantially higher than the costs of using
inputs purchased through outsourcing.
Transaction cost economics and outsourcing
The theory of the firm literature (Coase, 1937;
Williamson, 1975; and others) suggests that while
outsourcing is beneficial to many firms because mar-
kets have advantages over internal production, it may
also be undesirable because market transactions im-
pose costs in some cases. The problem arises when
the transaction involves relationship-specific invest-
ment: sunk (unrecoverable) costs of entering an out-
sourcing relationship with a specific vendor.1 When a
transaction involves relationship-specific investment,
once the two parties have committed to the relation-
ship, it is possible that one or both parties may try to
demand more out of the transaction than was original-
ly agreed upon, taking advantage of the fact that the
other party has already made an investment specific
to the transactional relationship and so is unlikely to
withdraw. This is often referred to as a hold-up prob-
lem. As Williamson (1975) notes, each party may use
the threat of not trading to appropriate rents from the
other; these rents will be directly related to the sunk
costs each side has committed to the business relation-
ship. While these sunk costs encourage parties to re-
main in business relationships once they have begun,
the hold-up problem represents a deterrent to outsourc-
ing. If relation-specific costs are large, internal pro-
duction may be preferable.
In principle, firms in an outsourcing relationship
can write contracts to mitigate the risks of such hold-
ups. These contracts specify the relationship between
market events and payments made from one party to
the other. Contracts also specify how contingencies
are handled when information about future events is
imperfect. Contracts also may define patterns of asset
ownership in the business relationship in order to
align firms’ incentives in particular ways.4 1Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
However, entering contracts may prove costly for
two reasons. First, contracts carry transaction costs.
These are the costs associated with writing, negotiating,
and enforcing contracts.2 Because these costs are of-
ten high, contracts in the real world are often incom-
plete: They do not effectively cover every possible
contingency of the transaction. Thus, there will still
be incentives for opportunistic behavior even after the
contract is written. Given the risks of such opportunis-
tic behavior, firms may forego market transactions (out-
sourcing) and handle production internally, even if
they can not do so efficiently relative to the market.
Within this transaction cost economics framework,
the factors that make contracting more difficult will
deter outsourcing. These include the level of sunk costs
associated with the transaction; higher sunk costs
create greater scope for hold-up. Greater complexity
deters outsourcing, because it increases the cost of
writing the optimal contract. This could occur because
complex products are associated with a wider number
of contingencies for future outcomes. These contingen-
cies could pertain to costs for either party to the con-
tract, demand for the final good, or some other aspect
of the business environment. Complexity may also make
monitoring of the outside production effort difficult.
Related literature
There are not many empirical studies on the re-
lationship between firm size and outsourcing.3 The
most recent and very relevant study is Borzekowski
(2004), which also uses the data we use in this article.
Borzekowski shows the positive association between CU
size and its likelihood of outsourcing the DP system.
However, as we show later on, CU size and the diversi-
ty of its products are also positively correlated. In this
article, we examine whether the positive relationship
between CU size and the likelihood of outsourcing per-
sists after we control for the diversity of CU products,
as well as how size and product diversity interact.
There are only a few empirical papers that examine
the relationship between complexity and outsourcing.
Masten (1984) studies input procurement in the aero-
space industry, showing that more complex inputs are
less likely to be outsourced. Among more recent ef-
forts, Baker and Hubbard (2003) study the choice of
shippers to use private (in-house) or for-hire (outsourced)
drivers as their carriers and find that market segments
where drivers perform complex tasks are more likely
to be served by in-house drivers and trucks.
Credit unions and data processing
With these ideas in mind, we examine firms’ de-
cision to outsource by using the data from call reports
that CUs submit to the National Credit Union Admin-
istration (NCUA). The data include information on
how CUs procure the automated DP systems to man-
age the records of their share and loan transactions.
CUs are financial institutions that provide bank-
ing services to their members. In principle, they are
nonprofit organizations, owned by their members. In
many cases, the CU is affiliated with an organization
from which it draws members; for example, large com-
panies like Boeing, state agencies, the Navy, and the
Pentagon all have CUs offering services to their mem-
bers. Based on the NCUA call reports, the total num-
ber of CU members grew from 65.1 million to 83.6
million between June 1994 and December 2003.
CUs earn income from interest on loans and in-
vestments, as well as fees charged for their services
(such as overdraft fees, ATM fees, and credit card fees).
Such income is spent on interest expenses, such as
dividends on shares, interest on deposits, as well as
non-interest expenses, including employee compen-
sation, benefits, travel and conference expenses, rent,
operations, member insurance (that is, borrower’s
protection and share insurance), and outside profes-
sional services. Often CUs use net proceeds (income
minus expense) to maintain or improve the financial
services they offer to members or to expand their op-
erations. In many ways, the structure of the CU indus-
try mirrors that of the commercial banking sector, which
represents the CUs’ primary competition.4 Beyond
managing checking and saving accounts, CUs offer a
wide array of financial services, including more so-
phisticated saving and investment options, as well as
personal loans and mortgages. Because of their status
as nonprofit organization, CUs are entitled to prefer-
ential tax treatment.
Data processing
Like all financial services providers, CUs need to
maintain detailed records of their clients’ transactions.
The core data for each customer usually include trans-
action records associated with checking or savings
accounts. Managing other financial products, such as
credit cards, personal loans, mortgages, as well as share
certificates, increases the complexity of DP require-
ments. Such data may come into the CU through tell-
er transactions, mail, phone, deposit boxes, and ATMs
(automated teller machine), or online. While in prin-
ciple CUs may track customer data manually (on
paper), the vast majority of CUs use some form of
computer system to handle their DP.
Internal versus outsourced DP services
The efficient way to source DP systems is a key
concern for CUs; trade publications (for example, the5 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
periodical Credit Union Tech-Talk) and industry con-
ferences reflect this emphasis by devoting considerable
attention to information technology (IT) issues and out-
sourcing in particular. We focus our analysis on CUs
that use some form of automated (computerized) data
processing system.5 Our sample comprises approximate-
ly 10,000 CUs, with the overall number declining over
the sample period 1994–2003 as CUs merge and exit
(see table 1).
Among CUs using automated DP systems, some
develop their own in-house and others choose various
degrees of outsourcing. In the data, CUs are given three
options to specify the type of their procurement of the
data-processing system. The first is “credit union de-
veloped in-house system,” which is the system devel-
oped and operated completely internally. The second
is “vendor-supplied in-house system,” which refers
to a system in which the CU purchases software from
a vendor, but operates hardware and software within
the CU. And the third is the vendor-supplied online
(VOL) system, which is the most complete form of
outsourcing. In this article, we focus on the choice
between this most complete form of outsourcing and
the alternatives, so the term “outsourcing” from here
on indicates the use of VOL.
In the VOL arrangement, the hardware and soft-
ware used for DP are located off-site at the vendor’s
service bureau, which handles DP for many or all of
its customers. The connection is made through a tele-
communications link connected to terminals in the CU
and these terminals may be proprietary terminals sup-
plied by the vendor or Windows-based PCs already
owned by the CU (or purchased by the CU). As shown
in table 1, about 26 percent to 30 percent of the CUs
in our sample choose VOL, with the percentage fall-
ing slightly over time.
TABLE 1
Credit unions using vendor online DP system
Sample with % with












Source: Authors’ calculations based on NCUA call reports.
Credit union size and DP outsourcing
The VOL system is likely to differ from in-house
production in its scale requirements. It involves low-
er fixed costs, both in terms of software development
and hardware. For these reasons, we might expect small-
er firms to employ VOL more often than larger firms.
CUs vary widely in terms of size. In December
2003, 14.2 percent of the CUs in our sample had less
than $2 million in assets, 14.9 percent had between
$2 million and $5 million, 16.2 percent had between
$5 million and $10 million, 32 percent had between
$10 million and $50 million, and 21 percent had $50
million or more. Table 2 shows the size distribution
of CUs employing both in-house and outsourced DP
services for December 2003. An interesting pattern
emerges. The mean firm size for CUs that outsource
is smaller than for those that do not outsource, while
median firm size for CUs that outsource is larger than
for those that do not outsource. Among the CUs that
do not use VOL, there are some that are very big, while
many others (about 67 percent) are smaller than the
median CU that uses VOL. Size distribution is much
tighter for those that use VOL, which also suggests that
both very small and very large CUs are more likely
to retain in-house DP services.6
Many small CUs offer less complex products than
bigger CUs, thus requiring a lower-tech DP system (such
as Microsoft Excel). If lower-tech DP systems have low-
er fixed costs, it may be worthwhile for smaller firms
to handle DP internally. Of course, small firms could
outsource these activities as well. However, if search
and transaction costs are lumpy or fixed, it may not make
sense to outsource such simple activities for which a
supplier may not provide large cost advantages. It also
might be easier for firms to monitor internal produc-
tion given the simplicity of their DP requirements.
TABLE 2








Standard deviation 377 154
10th percentile 10.8 49.3
90th percentile 164 88.5
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NCUA call reports
for December 2003.6 1Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
On the other hand, medium and large firms offer
more sophisticated products, which require complex
DP systems. While performing DP in-house allows
flexibility in dealing with complex DP tasks, it could
be that only the largest CUs achieve efficient scale
for internal DP functions. Transaction costs may also
account for this discrepancy. In the context of DP, the
relationship-specific investment arises from the neces-
sity to train employees to use the systems specific to
a vendor. Vendors may also have specific hardware
and data organization requirements that are not easily
transferable to competitors’ systems. These sunk costs
make it difficult for CUs to switch vendors. In such
circumstances, CUs would be vulnerable to the oppor-
tunistic behavior of vendors. This requires contract-
ing. If the costs of contracting for DP are relatively
fixed, smaller firms will be deterred from outsourc-
ing while medium firms will find it worthwhile. Larger
firms may find it worthwhile to outsource but may
also be able to achieve efficient scale internally.
Product offerings and outsourcing
Here, we discuss the relationship between out-
sourcing and product offerings. Most CUs’ data pro-
cessing requirements involve handling data on share
(deposit) information. This includes both share (savings)
and share draft (checking) data. Beyond these basic
saving and checking accounts, many CUs offer more
sophisticated vehicles for saving and investing, as
well as various types of loan options. Included among
these are saving instruments such as share certificates,
IRA accounts, money market accounts, auto loans,
credit cards, fixed rate mortgages, variable rate mort-
gages, and home equity loans. We count how many
of these eight products are offered by each CU and use
this as a measure for the diversity of product offerings.7
Table 3 shows data covering our entire sample
period, 1994–2003. On average, for about 21 percent
of our sample, the data-processing systems deal with
only one additional type of financial transaction be-
yond the basic savings and checking account data, while
for about 16 percent of CUs, the DP systems process
seven or eight additional types of transactions.
The degree of product diversity might affect out-
sourcing decisions in two ways. First, diversity might
increase the minimum scale necessary to adequately
produce DP services in-house. Diverse products require
more sophisticated software, requiring a larger on-site
IT staff to maintain the system. This would make multi-
product firms more likely to outsource than single-prod-
uct firms of similar size.
A second factor affecting the relationship between
product diversity and outsourcing is transaction costs.
Outsourcing a DP system that manages diverse prod-
ucts would require more detailed contracts and great-
er contingency coverage. Tellers would also require
more training to use a specific vendor system. Such
factors increase the sunk costs of entering outsourc-
ing relationships, making hold-up more likely. If CUs
with more diverse products have greater scope for
data analysis, transaction costs might be higher for
those with many product offerings as well. In addition,
because software is not located on-site and data are
also managed remotely, CUs face the risk of unantici-
pated downtime for the online system. While disas-
ter recovery is usually covered in the standard vendor
contract (Klepper and Jones, 1998), the services may
not always be satisfactory. These problems might also
be more severe for CUs with complex products. Given
that the system is not owned by the CU, the CU would
not have full control over how the problems are re-
solved. All of these factors may encourage CUs with
a wide range of products to perform data processing
in-house.
Table 3 provides details of the interesting relation-
ship between product offerings and outsourcing. A
greater number of products is associated with a greater
likelihood of outsourcing, but only to a point. CUs
with six additional loan or share data-processing re-
quirements are most likely to outsource their data
processing. Those offering either fewer or more than
six products are less likely to outsource. Again, this
suggests that there are countervailing influences at
work. As we mentioned before, as the number of prod-
ucts increases, DP needs become more complex, which
might reduce the attractiveness of outsourcing if it
increases transaction costs. On the other hand, product
diversity might also incur greater fixed costs, which
would increase the attractiveness of outsourcing.
TABLE 3
Credit unions using vendor online DP system
Number of % of % using










Source: Authors’ calculations based on NCUA call reports.7 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
It is also possible that this relation-
ship between the propensity to outsource
and product diversity is simply picking
up the relationship between the propensi-
ty to outsource and CU size. Figure 1
illustrates the positive relationship be-
tween CU size and product variety. CUs
that offer more products are typically
larger. Because they achieve internal
scale economies, larger CUs may prefer
not to outsource data processing when
their product range is diverse, because
the increased complexity in data process-
ing reduces the benefit of outsourcing.
However, outsourcing may still be pre-
ferred by smaller CUs offering more
products, because smaller CUs do not
have the same internal scale economies.
To distinguish the effects of size
from the effects of complexity, in table 4
we stratify CUs by size and examine how
the propensity to outsource changes with
the number of products. While some
cells in the table use a small number of
CUs and are therefore noisy, the table
suggests some fairly clear patterns. For
smaller CUs, we see that outsourcing be-
comes more likely as the number of
products increases. This is consistent with the notion
that smaller CUs do not have scale economies in deal-
ing with complex data processing, forcing them to
use vendors if they offer complex products. The pat-
tern also exists for medium-sized CUs, although the
effect is not quite so dramatic. For large CUs, how-
ever, the relationship is reversed—a greater number
of products seems to be associated with in-house DP.
This relationship is more consistent with a transaction-
cost-based explanation, whereby complex DP creates
a difficult contracting environment and, therefore,
encourages in-house production.
Probit analysis
To further explore these relationships, we perform
a probit analysis, specifying cross-sectional variation
in outsourcing as a function of size and product diver-
sity. The general empirical framework we employ is
a discrete choice model in which a CU outsources when
Yit
* = α  + β 1 Sizeit + β 2 Nit + β 3 (Sizeit ×  Nit) + year
dummies + other control variables + ε it > 0,
where Yit
* represents the net benefit of outsourcing
for CU i in year t. CU size is measured by the loga-
rithm of assets that is deflated by GDP deflator (base
year is set at 2003) and N stands for the number of
products that a CU offers. As we mentioned, based
on table 4, it appears that product mix has different
effects based on CU size, so we include the interac-
tion term Sizeit ×  Nit. We assume that the error ε it is
normally distributed and estimate the above equation
by performing probit analyses,8 where a CU outsources
when Yit
* > 0 based on our whole sample of 98,449
observations. We also include a dummy variable in-
dicating whether the CU is located in an urban area.
Existing studies (Hubbard, 2001; Ono, 2001) suggest
that local market size affects the propensity to out-
source.9 In our data, while CUs in urban and rural
markets offer roughly the same number of products,
urban CUs are on average larger. Thus, not control-
ling for location may cloud our interpretation of the
size coefficient.10 We also include dummies indicat-
ing the CU’s field of membership, or group that it
serves. Such groups are defined by community, asso-
ciation, educational institution, military group, gov-
ernment entity, as well as companies (Borzekowski,
2004). Specific types of membership groups are like-
ly to be associated with other characteristics of CUs
as well as their outsourcing propensity; by control-
ling for the field of membership, we can net out the
FIGURE 1
Credit union size by number of products
log of assets (deflated, base year = 2003), whole sample period
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
Assets ($million), log-scale
Notes: The center line in the shaded box indicates the median. The upper
line of the box is the 75th percentile, and the bottom line is the 25th
percentile. The upper adjacent line indicates the value that is approximately
1.5 times the gap between the 25th and 75th percentiles above the 75th
percentile. The lower adjacent line indicates the value that is approximately
1.5 times the gap between the 25th and 75th percentiles below the 25th
percentile.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on NCUA call reports.
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Log assets (deflated)a 16.05 1.69
Number of products 3.84 2.22
FOM: Community 0.070 0.26
FOM: Association 0.058 0.23
FOM: Education 0.082 0.27
FOM: Military 0.014 0.12
FOM: Government 0.118 0.32
Located in urban areasb 0.79 0.41
aBase year is 2003.
bAreas within PMSA under 1994 definition.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NCUA call reports.
TABLE 4
Percentage of CUs outsourcing by size and number of products, 1994–2003
Number of products
Assets (deflated) 1234567 8
Less than $10 million 10.5 15.1 20.8 29.0 33.8 39.5 45.3 34.2
(19,393) (12,841) (9,552) (6,846) (2,954) (948) (192) (38)
$10 million–$50 million 40.3 34.8 40.6 45.9 45.8 47.6 45.6 44.8
(821) (1,526) (2,571) (5,377) (7,468) (6,761) (4,192) (1,014)
$50 million or more 66.3 34.8 38.0 37.5 30.7 28.7 23.6 18.8
(101) (135) (184) (539) (1,623) (3,243) (5,648) (4,482)
All 12.00 17.40 25.20 36.50 40.80 41.30 33.20 23.70
Note: Number of observations in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NCUA call reports.
effect of the group that the CU services from that of
CU size and the diversity of their services. Table 5
shows the summary statistics of the variables included
in the analysis.
Table 6 shows our results. The coefficients for
CU size, the number of products (N), and the interac-
tion terms between them are all significant. The coef-
ficients for CU size and N are both positive, and that
for the interaction term is negative.11
This suggests that both size and product diversi-
ty (N) increase the propensity to outsource, but that
at higher levels of N, the relationship reverses. Based
on the results in table 6, for CUs with average char-
acteristics, the relationship between the probability
of outsourcing and the number of products is:
d (Prob of Outsourcing) / dN = 0.581–.0340 Size.
d (Prob of Outsourcing) / dN is positive for a CU with
log(assets) below 17.09.12 For CUs larger than this,
offering additional products is associated with a lower
probability of outsourcing. Again, this is consistent
with the idea that when DP requirements are more com-
plex, larger CUs may prefer to perform the services
in-house in order to avoid the costs of specifying many
details on the contract. It is also possible that larger
CUs experience greater benefits from retaining the
flexibility that in-house DP allows, or that DP com-
plexity makes monitoring the outsourced relationship
more difficult.13
For small CUs, on the other hand, the probabili-
ty of outsourcing is greater for those that offer a wider
range of products. It is possible that for small CUs,
the benefit of relying on scale economies in a vendor
may outweigh the benefits of performing DP in-house.
The outsourcing options might have influenced
the number of products that CUs offer. Among CUs
that do not use vendor online systems, however, the
majority purchase the software from vendors, which
usually can accommodate as wide a range of prod-
ucts as the VOL. We also ran the probit analysis ex-
cluding the CUs that reported they develop the
software by themselves, and our results remained
qualitatively the same.
Another way of interpreting our empirical re-
sults is to focus on size. From table 6,
d (Prob of Outsourcing) / dSize = 0.1679–.0340 N.
The effect of Size is zero when N is about five.
For CUs offering more than five products, the rela-
tionship between the likelihood of outsourcing and
CU size is negative. Again, when the product offered
is complex, larger CUs may be more likely to perform
DP in-house, in order to avoid high transaction costs.
For CUs offering fewer than five products, the relation-
ship between size and propensity to outsource is pos-
itive. When the degree of product diversity is low, small
CUs may find in-house DP less costly, considering9 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 6




CU size: log assets (deflated) 0.1679*** 0.0061
Number of products 0.5812*** 0.0189
Number of products × CU size –0.0340*** 0.0011
FOM: Communitya 0.0243** 0.0127
FOM: Associationa –0.0558*** 0.0143
FOM: Educationa –0.0576*** 0.0116
FOM: Militarya –0.0446 0.0266
FOM: Governmenta –0.0179* 0.0103
Dummy: located in urban areasa 0.0094 0.0096
Dummy: y95a –0.0079*** 0.0028
Dummy: y96a –0.0291*** 0.0041
Dummy: y97a –0.0400*** 0.0042
Dummy: y98a –0.0407*** 0.0044
Dummy: y99a –0.0442*** 0.0045
Dummy: y00a –0.0446*** 0.0047
Dummy: y01a –0.0503*** 0.0048
Dummy: y02a –0.0598*** 0.0043
Dummy: y03a –0.0593*** 0.0045
Predicted probability at mean 0.2730
Number of observations 98,271
adF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; assets are deflated
by GDP deflator (base year = 2003).
Notes: Base year is 1994; White-correlated standard errors with clustering
over credit unions were calculated; *** indicates significant at 1 percent level;
** indicates significant at 5 percent level; and * indicates significant at 10
percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NCUA call reports.
the search costs and contract costs asso-
ciated with outsourcing. In contrast, large
firms have more negotiating power and
may receive favorable treatment from
vendors; thus for them, the benefits of
outsourcing may outweigh the contract-
ing costs as long as the DP requirements
are not too complicated. Therefore, when
a big CU offers a relatively small range
of products—and, consequently, when
the contract it has to negotiate if it
chooses to outsource is less complicated—
the CU might see more benefit from out-
sourcing compared with performing DP
in-house.
Conclusion
Outsourcing has become a much ex-
amined and debated issue. Researchers
are increasingly recognizing that, in ad-
dition to the economic issues associated
with outsourcing across national borders,
outsourcing decisions are a key compo-
nent of business strategy. Little is known,
however, about the factors that affect
firms’ outsourcing decisions. We have
addressed one aspect of this issue by ex-
amining CUs’ outsourcing decisions. We
find that both CU size and product di-
versity are important factors influencing
a CU’s decision to outsource DP. While it appears
that CU size and product diversity may have indepen-
dent effects, they also interact; the relationship be-
tween outsourcing and CU size depends on the number
of products that the CU offers and vice versa.
Our analysis reveals that, in general, larger CUs
are more likely to outsource their DP function, although
the relationship is reversed for the very largest CUs.
This stands in contrast to a simple scale-based expla-
nation for outsourcing. Product diversity in general
has an intuitive impact. For smaller CUs without the
capacity to handle sophisticated DP functions, having
more products increases their propensity to outsource.
Again, for larger CUs the relationship is reversed. Large
CUs exhibit a positive relationship between the num-
ber of products and in-house data processing. This
may reflect larger firms’ desire to make their data
processing part of their core competency, a strategy
they can pursue because they have sufficient scale.
Our results imply that outsourcing is probably
driven by a combination of factors rather than any one
simple influence. While scale economies are an im-
portant determinant of firms’ outsourcing decisions,
the transaction costs associated with using vendors,
which vary based on firms’ characteristics, seem to
affect their decisions.10 1Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
1Sunk costs are investment costs that can never be recouped. For
example, when an investment made by a firm has no intrinsic value
to other firms, cannot be sold in a secondary market, or cannot be
allocated to another use within the firm, the investment represents
sunk costs.
2Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975) identified four types of trans-
action costs. “First, some contingencies which the parties will face
may not be foreseeable at the contracting date. Second, even if
they could be foreseen, there may be too many contingencies to
write into the contract. Third, monitoring the contract may be
costly. Fourth, enforcing contracts may involve considerable legal
costs.” (Tirole, 1988)
3Some evidence on the relationship between outsourcing and firm
size can be found in Abraham and Taylor (1996) and Ono (2001)
although it was not the main focus of these papers. Examining the
relationship between manufacturers’ decision to contract out
business services and manufacturers’ characteristics, Abraham
and Taylor (1996) found support for the scale-based story for
outsourcing practices for business services, including janitorial,
accounting, and computer services. In contrast, using the Annual
Survey of Manufactures and examining manufacturing establish-
ments’ practices of outsourcing advertising, accounting and book-
keeping, legal services, as well as data processing, Ono (2003)
finds evidence inconsistent with the scale-based story.
4See Emmons and Schmid (2000) for a discussion of the competi-
tive interplay between CUs and commercial banks.
5We exclude CUs that use manual or paper-based systems. Be-
cause we examine the procurement of DP systems that manage
share and loan information, we also exclude CUs whose loan or
lease amount recorded is zero and those that do not indicate that
they offer any typical loan products, including auto loan, credit
card, and mortgage. We also limit our analysis to CUs of more
than 100 members. None of these restrictions has a qualitative
impact on our analysis.
6As shown in table 2, 90th percentile assets of CUs with in-house
data processing are greater than those of outsourcing CUs.
7The banking literature draws a distinction between products that
appear on the bank’s balance sheet as assets (such as loans) and
those that appear as liabilities (such as checking accounts). For
our purposes, we assume that consumers view all financial ser-
vices as “products” defined broadly.
8Our data are a panel, but for simplicity here we present results
from a specification that does not fully exploit this dimension of the
data, for example, by including firm fixed effects. We did estimate
a fixed-effects model and obtained qualitatively similar results.
9It is possible that urban locations have a greater supply of IT per-
sonnel, allowing CUs to carry an internal IT department at lower cost.
At the same time, a dense local IT labor market might be associ-
ated with greater turnover of IT personnel. In such a case, CUs
may decide to outsource in order to avoid the costs associated with
high IT personnel turnover.
10See Ono (2001) for an analysis of local market effects on
outsourcing.
11We also ran the probit analysis, excluding military and govern-
mental CUs as well as some very small and very large CUs whose
log assets (deflated) are below and above 3 standard deviations
from the mean. This left us with 85,156 observations. The results
of the probit remained qualitatively the same. For this restricted
sample, we also ran the probit for each year. The coefficients for
size, product complexity, and their interaction terms were qualita-
tively the same across years.
12This corresponds to assets of roughly $26 million (deflated by
the GDP deflator, base year = 2003).
13See Baker and Hubbard (2003).
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